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Abstract 
 
The UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol) is an international 
instrument addressing the potential environment and health issues of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs).  Its article 27 on Liability and Redress, which finally has 
been explored as a new treaty - “Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol” 
(Supplementary Protocol) was recently adopted in October 2010. The new Protocol chose 
an administrative approach instead of an international civil liability regime, and left the 
implementation to the discretion of competent national authorities of the parties as rather 
a “national approach”.  
As a party to the Biosafety Protocol, China might take the Supplementary Protocol into 
account for its own biosafety regime. The interplay between the Biosafety Protocol (and 
the Supplementary Protocol) with China’s national biosafety regime will be briefly 
examined in this paper. It argues that a comprehensive biosafety law will be needed to 
oversee the import and export of GMOs, as well as efficiently manage cultivation of GM 
crops within China. The paper concludes that the inclusion of a liability clause into the 
biosafety law seems necessary for China’s obligation to the Biosafety protocol to deal 
with the uncertainties of GMOs, thereby ensuring the sustainable development of 
biotechnology.   
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 Introduction  
A genetically modified organism (GMO) is an organism in which the genetic material 
(DNA) has been altered by means of genetic engineering techniques.
1
 It could be 
regarded as “a way that does not occur naturally by mating and /or natural 
recombination”.2 GMO include both living modified organism (LMO) which is capable 
of growing and organisms which are not able to be replicated any more.
3
 The LMO is 
defined in the Biosafety Protocol as “living organism that possesses a novel combination 
of genetic material obtained through the use of biotechnology”.4  
Since the application of biotechnology appears in various areas such as agriculture, 
pharmaceuticals, mineral development and even environmental protection,
5
 this paper 
mainly focuses on its main use in agricultural and food production, which provokes the 
“highly polarized reaction” among scientists, industry manufacturers, consumers and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and regulators in developed countries and 
developing countries as well.
6
 Like many other modern technologies, along with the 
benefits, biotechnology also brings corresponding environmental, health and social risks.
7
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Status of GMOs cultivation in the world 
The number of countries cultivating biotech crops reaches 29 and the accumulated 
hectarage planted during the 15 years since 1996 to 2010 exceeded 1 billion hectares, 
double of the number in 2005. USA contributes 66.8 million hectares at the top of the list, 
followed by Brazil, Argentina, India, Canada and China, etc.
8
  
There are two main GM traits currently commercialized as herbicide tolerance (HT) and 
insect resistance (IR),
9
 and the main biotech plants are maize, oilseed rape, soybeans and 
cotton, etc in the worldwide. As shown in a survey of Chinese plant biotechnologists, 
China is developing the largest capacity of plant biotechnology outside of North 
America.
10
 
The most successful and large-commercialized GM plant promoted by Chinese scientists 
is IR Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) Cotton which was introduced in 1999.
11
 However, the 
recently approved Bt rice in China in 2009 has suddenly put the safety issue of GMOs at 
the top of public attention as a hotly debated issue, because of the central role of rice in 
the Chinese diet.
12
 
Benefits of GMOs 
The use of GMOs in agricultural areas are deemed to have several potential benefits, such 
as improving quality and quantity of certain crops which are important especially for 
those who are suffering from hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. It also 
helps by reducing the use of pesticides which is to some extent good for the preservation 
of natural habitats;
13
 and improving “plant adaption to unfavorable environments” in the 
era of climate change.
14
  
Risks of GMOs 
Concerns about the potential risks associated with GMOs consist of direct and indirect 
impacts on environment and human beings.
15
  Some of the effects include those on Non-
target organisms and soil and water ecosystems; gene flow by pollination to wild 
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relatives to create “Super weed” or “contamination” of conventional crops. Others are the 
declining of population of species which is detrimental for biodiversity; and allergenicity 
reaction of certain kinds of people if some known allergens containing in sources of 
genes for production of GM crops.
16
  
 
Liability and Redress of GMOs 
Different perceptions of uncertainties involved in GMOs have lead to the development of 
several initiatives to regulate them.
17
 The divergence between the US and the EU could 
prove to be a good example.
18
 While the EU sticks to justify the important role of 
Precautionary Principle in GMO use and trade, the US assumes the GM crops are not 
necessarily different from the conventional crops according to the principle of Substantial 
Equivalence.
19
 In addition, the transatlantic divergence apparently influences the choices 
of developing countries when they start to face the challenge of biotechnology, since 
many of them are expecting to export food products to the European market. If they 
choose to follow the US way to produce GM foods, the chance for their products to be 
accepted by European counterparts shall not be optimistic.
20
 
Even some well-funded national competent authorities like Department of Agriculture, 
Food and Drug Administration and Environmental Protection Agency of US are still 
increasing demand of budgets to cope with the new challenge associated with 
biotechnology.
21
 Obviously, this appears not to be the case in developing states. If 
biotechnology offers particular benefits for the developing world to help confront the 
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emerging issues such as increasing population and poverty
22
, it might also pose “severe 
challenges”,23 because developing countries are normally in lack of enough capacity to 
adequately manage the GMOs and its potential risks.
24
  
 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the consequences of accidents should be taken into 
account while developing a regulatory framework to ensure safe use of GMOs.
25
 This is 
why developing countries proposed the Biosafety Protocol to ensure the environment and 
their citizens will not be put at risk during the transboundary movement of GMOs. It also 
explains their willingness to have an international binding civil liability to protect their 
own interests.   
 
As a ‘State- of- the-art’ technology, there is still a little scientific data available 
concerning its risk and benefits, “particularly long-term risks and benefits.”26 Questions 
like how to take into account the uncertainties caused by the release of GMOs in the long 
run and whether and how the liability mechanisms could be developed to deal with those 
scientific concerns have left enough spaces for discussion.
27
  Needless to say that the 
issue with regard to developing a liability mechanism for GMO release is not only hotly 
debated at the international level but also at the regional or national level.
28
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In general, legal liability regimes serve the functions such as prevention, correction, and 
reparation in terms of environmental issues.
29
  
As noted by Jungcurt and Schabus:   
The main function of liability and redress in international law is to provide for response 
measures and restitution in the case of certain activities causing damage to the 
environment. In addition, regimes for liability and redress contribute to preventing 
damage by exposing operators to financial liability, thus inducing them to adopt 
measures that minimize risks of damage.  
Therefore liability and redress not only serves to enforce environmental rules that 
envisage implementation of the polluter pays principle, it can also be used as a 
mechanism to prevent damage from occurring which is particularly relevant since the 
Biosafety Protocol embodies the precautionary approach.
30
  
 
The Biosafety Protocol and the Supplementary Protocol  
History of the Biosafety Protocol  
The Biosafety Protocol is the main international instrument addressing the potential 
environment and health issues of GMOs.
31
 Its article 27 on Liability and Redress which 
has finally been explored as a new Supplementary Protocol,
32
 was recently adopted in 
October 2010. Its full name “the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on 
Liability and Redress” witnesses the contribution of two countries to the achievement that 
the Supplementary Protocol was adopted in Nagoya, Japan in 2010 and the mandate of 
the first negotiating group was adopted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2004.
33
The 
Biosafety Protocol was actually adopted in Montreal on 29 January 2000 after several 
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years of negotiations, and it entered into force on 11 September 2003, after ratification by 
fifty states parties to the Cartagena Protocol. As of July 2010, there were 159 parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol.
34
  
Its main scope is about “transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of all living 
modified organisms that may have the adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity”, and also the “risks to human health”.35 As stated in its article 
27, the issue with regard to liability and redress was required to develop within four years 
of its ratification.
36
  
In accordance with the Decision BS-I/8 concluded in the first COP/MOP conference in 
2004, an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on 
Liability and Redress (hereinafter referred to as an Ad Hoc Group on Liability and 
Redress) was established with a mandate to summarize general issues related to the 
“potential or actual damage scenarios of concern”. It is mandated to consider the 
international rules and procedures on liability and redress that might be applied to those 
concerns, and to elaborate on options for elements of rules and procedures.
37
 
Negotiation Process of the Supplementary Protocol  
The Ad Hoc Group on Liability and Redress had five working group meetings between 
2005 and 2008. Although some agreements were reached on some elements of an 
international regime, delegates did not reach “common ground” on some key issues such 
as whether the regime should be legally binding and what kind of legal approach was 
necessary to address the liability and redress issue.
38
 While most of the developing 
countries argued for an international binding civil liability regime, the majority of 
developed countries including the EU would prefer to implement a “domestic 
administrative approach” with introduction of the concept of international rules mainly 
because they normally have already had the domestic civil liability in place.
39
 
Due to the fundamental disagreements in the last working group meetings, the final 
meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Liability and Redress held in March 2008 in Cartagena 
was unable to resolve these issues and the Friend of Co-Chair was mandated 
consequently to take over the responsibility.
40
 The Group of Friends of Co-Chairs 
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comprises six representatives each from the African Group, the Latin America and 
Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and Asia-Pacific Group; two representatives from 
European Union and Central and Eastern Europe; and one representative each from New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Japan.
41
   
Four informal meetings were held by the Friend of Co-Chair between 2008 and 2010. 
The fourth one was scheduled three days prior to the COP/MOP-5 meeting in Nagoya to 
finalize the final draft of liability and redress.  
The discussion on legal approach of the international liability proved to be the most 
contentious issue. There were three options discussed: a binding instrument on civil 
liability, completely non-binding instrument and the dual approach, i.e., a binding 
instrument on administrative approach and a non-binding civil liability instrument.
42
  
During the negotiations, three main positions were adopted respectively by three groups 
of parties. One of the groups consists of Malaysia, Ethiopia, Colombia, Liberia, Burkina 
Faso, India, Namibia, Norway and South Africa, and was in favor of a binding 
international civil liability instrument. While Japan, Brazil and Paraguay sitting on the 
other side argued for non-binding instrument, the EU, New Zealand and Switzerland 
chose a “middle” way by proposing for the binding instrument on administrative 
approach with a non-binding civil liability instrument.
43
 This will be discussed later in the 
course of this paper.       
It is important to note that two outstanding issues were left to the final Friends of Co-
Chairs meeting in Nagoya, the one is definition of LMOs and “product of LMOs”,44 and 
another is a provision on “financial security”.45  
a. Financial Security 
After a series of bilateral meetings between parties and the Friend of Co-Chair, Co-Chair 
Lefeber reported the disagreements of Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay and South Africa on the 
financial security issue, because they could not accept it in an operative part of the text 
rather than inclusion of a preambular reference and a technical study. Malaysia rejected 
this proposal and insisted on the need for the inclusion of this provision in the operative 
text.
46
 
Finally after informal consultations, Malaysia reported that parties have agreed on a 
compromising language, which is “Parties retain the right to provide, in their domestic 
law, for financial security” and they should exercise this right “in a manner consistent 
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with their rights and obligations under international law, taking into account the final 
three preambular paragraphs of the Protocol”.47 They also agreed that after the entry into 
force of the Supplementary Protocol, the first COP/MOP meeting shall request the 
Secretariat to undertake a comprehensive study which will consist of “the modalities of 
financial security mechanism” and “an assessment of the environmental, economic and 
social impacts of such mechanism” particularly on developing countries, as well as “an 
identification of the appropriate entities to provide financial security”.48  
b. Product Thereof 
As for the definition of LMOs and “product thereof”, it seems surprisingly even more 
difficult to reach an agreement among some Parties which are Friends of Co-Chair. The 
discussion was based on the outcome of last Friends of Co-Chair meeting, which was to 
replace “product thereof” with “including products containing LMOs”.49 The key issue 
was whether that “product thereof” would only refer to living materials, or the dead 
materials shall also be included.
50
  Japan opposed the latter one, and argued that this 
would make the scope of the Supplementary Protocol go beyond the scope of Biosafety 
Protocol. This opinion was supported by South Africa, Philippine, Brazil, Paraguay and 
China.
51
   
Mexico noted that the discussion of “product thereof” is unnecessary since the Biosafety 
Protocol only refers to LMOs.
52
 On the contrary, Bolivia, Namibia, the African Group 
with the exception of South Africa, Malaysia, Ukraine and South Korea were in favor of 
the inclusion of “product thereof”.  
After several informal consultations, Malaysia presented a compromising reference 
consisting of an amendment to the Bolivian proposal, as amended by Mexico, stating that 
“product thereof” include materials that “are capable of replicating in the environment”. 
While Japan, Brazil, the EU, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine and the African Group in 
principle accepted this proposal, the Philippines however suggested an amendment to this 
reference as “are capable of naturally reproducing in the environment”.53 Paraguay, South 
Africa, India and China requested for more time to consider the proposal, and China 
noted that this might still change the scope of the Biosafety Protocol.
54
    
The three days’ meeting failed to resolve the last issue.  Informal consultations continued 
on Saturday, 9
th
 October 2010. Malaysia supported by Ukraine suggested deleting the 
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“product thereof” and to replace by “LMOs in the context of the Protocol”, India, China, 
Paraguay and the Philippines then proposed “as defined in the Proposal” for 
consideration.
55
  
It was not until late Sunday, 10
th
 October 2010, that the Friends of Co-Chairs reached a 
final agreement to delete the reference to “product thereof” and to include a statement of 
different understanding (See below) of parties on the application of Article 27 of Liability 
and Redress of Biosafety Protocol in the COP/MOP 5 report.
56
 The draft of the 
Supplementary Protocol text was then adopted in the early morning of Monday, 11
th
 
October 2010.  
It stated:  
It emerged during the negotiation of the Supplementary Protocol that Parties to the 
Protocol hold different understandings of the application of Article 27 of the Protocol to 
processed materials that are of living modified organism-origin. One such understanding 
is that Parties may apply the supplementary Protocol to damage caused by such 
processed materials, provided that a causal link is established between the damage and 
the living modified organism in question.
57
 
Also worthy of note is an initiative of voluntary-based liability and redress mechanism 
“Compact” of biotechnology.58 Suffice it to say that one of the main reasons why 
countries do not ratify existing international regimes on liability and redress is because of 
its lack of financial security or insurance policy. As a result of the uncertainty of damage 
caused by GMOs, “a cap could be introduced on the amount that operators can be liable 
for, in combination with a fund to compensate damage beyond the cap and /or rules on 
residual State liability.” The cap would “make the risk insurable from the perspective of 
financial institutions,” according to the “Compact” of biotechnology. 59  
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The “Compact” set up by six leading biotechnology companies is such a voluntary 
scheme.
60
 The contribution of the “Compact” to the liability and redress regime for 
damage caused by GMOs will be seen in the future,
61
  how it works and “complements” 
the Supplementary Protocol still remains unknown.  
Summary of the Supplementary Protocol  
Ten years after the adoption of the Biosafety Protocol, the Supplementary Protocol, as 
earlier stated, was adopted in the COP-MOP 5 conference as a new treaty on 15
th
 October, 
2010.
62
  It is an important step towards the implementation of Article 27 of Biosafety 
Protocol on liability and redress of biodiversity damage associated with the 
transboundary movement of GMOs.  
Due to the unwillingness of some parties to agree to binding norms on civil liability,
63
 the 
Supplementary Protocol finally comprises of a set of administrative approach to provide 
that Parties have rights to deal with response measure in the event of damage caused by 
LMOs according to their domestic regulations.  
Response measures are required of the “operator”64 or the competent authority if the 
operator is unable to take any response measures. The Parties shall require the operators 
to keep the competent authority informed immediately once damage occurs, and to 
evaluate the damage and take appropriate measures to deal with damages. The competent 
authority shall identify the operator which has caused the damage, and evaluate the 
damage and determine the appropriate measures which can be used by operators to deal 
with LMOs damage.  This might be suitable for the purpose of such a Protocol to protect 
biodiversity, which is different from traditional damage such as property loss or human 
injuries, operator or competent authority may be in most appropriate position to consider 
what measures shall be taken to deal with damages 
65
  
The Supplementary Protocol provides “flexibilities to accommodate different priorities, 
legal systems” of the parties and “practices of operators” involved. However, the success 
of this approach will largely depend on the “competence” of such competent authorities 
                                                          
60
 Telesetsky, supra note 58, at 5. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Mariam Mayet, Biosafety Protocol: Ten Years in and Lagging far Behind, African Centre for Biosafety, 
October 2010, http://www.biosafety-info.net/article.php?aid=738, last accessed April 2011.  
63
 Noah Sachs, ‘Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in International Environmental 
Law’, (2008) 55 UCLA Law Review 837, at 841-842; Maia Lee, ‘Tort, Regulation and Environmental 
Liability’, (2002) 22(1) Legal Studies, 34; Stuart J. Smyth, Drew L. Kershen, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology: 
Legal Liability Regimes from Comparative and International Perspectives’, (2006) Global Jurist Advances, 6 
(2),  59-60.  
64
 Supra note 47, art. 2.2 (c), “Operator” means any person in direct or indirect control of the living 
modified organism which could, as appropriate and as determined by domestic law, include, inter alia, the 
permit holder, the person who placed the living modified organism on the market, developer, producer, 
notifier, exporter, importer, carrier or supplier;  
65
 Tladi, supra note 40, at 20, this is mainly argued by the EU who is in favor of the comprise approach; 
Smyth, Endres, Redick and Kershen (ed), Innovation and Liability in Biotechnology: Transnational and 
Comparative Perspectives  (Edward and Elgar, 2010) at 73-75.   
of the parties.
66
 If the competent authority is endowed with enough expertise to determine 
adequate response measures in a timely manner, it works somehow efficiently to dealing 
with prevention and reparation of damage.  
However, in case of developing countries lacking the necessary resources or competent 
authorities, they might find them difficult to monitor the transboundary movement of 
GMOs and respond to the possible damage.
67
 It is expected that the imbalance between 
developed countries and developing countries to implement the Supplementary Protocol 
will inevitably exist.  The only way to address this gap will be by increasing “capacity 
building” for developing countries and emphasizing the collaboration between 
developing countries and developed countries.
68
     
Fifty states and the EU have signed the Supplementary Protocol by March 2012 and will 
enter into force until 40 ratifications. Czech Republic and Latvia are the first group to 
ratify it by February, 2012.
69
  
 
The Regulation of GMOs in China 
Status of Biotechnology Research and Development (R&D) in China 
Unlike most developed countries, where agricultural biotechnology is dominated by a 
few multinational companies, many developing countries are in favor of public research 
for their own domestic needs, and to improve the research capacity.
70
 China is a perfect 
example. As mentioned earlier, China is one of the countries with tremendous interests in 
developing biotechnology.  
It is estimated that China’s population will reach 1.45 billion by 2020, and an increase of 
25% of grain productivity will be needed to cope with the overload population and 
shortage of food, caused by “increasing urbanization, industrialization” and “farmland 
reduction” accompanying the shift of farmer labor to the cities.71 Chinese government is 
“putting its weight” behind GMOs as the country’s staple food resources.72  
Since the first transgenic plant-Bt tobacco has been commercialized in 1990s in China, 
the Chinese government is increasingly investing on the R&D of new GMO plant 
varieties.
73
 Bt Cotton is the most successful GM crop in China, 13Bt cotton varieties were 
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planted in 12 provinces, it is reported that control of cotton bollworm was satisfactory 
with introduction of Bt Cotton. It is to be noted that the percentage of terminal and square 
damage in Bt cotton was less than 1 % when compared to an average damage of 40-90% 
of non-Bt cotton.
74
    
In 2008, the State Council of China approved an investment of $3.5 billion on R&D 
initiative of genetically modified plants for the next 12 years.
75
  Two insect-resistant GM 
rice have recently been issued the biosafety certificates by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
2009,
76
 which has triggered a nation-wide debate, because rice plants occupy an 
important role in Chinese daily meal. Moreover, some illegal release of Bt rice has been 
found in the farmlands and supermarkets of the south and central area of China in 2005 
without any official approval.
77
 The question also has been raised as a significant 
international consequence of possible “contamination” of Chinese rice supply, as China is 
the largest rice producer and consumers in the world.
78
  
 
China and the Biosafety Protocol  
International laws or treaties should necessarily reflect the interests of States, moreover, 
implementation of these international laws at national level seems to be of necessity to 
make them effective.
79
 China signed the Biosafety Protocol in 2002, and ratified it in 
2005. As a party to the Biosafety Protocol, China is considering the implementation of it 
in its national legislations.
80
 Therefore, China is inevitably confronting a dilemma to 
balance the innovative application of biotechnology and increasing awareness of 
biosafety.  
There appears to be three options available to governments to deal with innovation and 
uncertainties. First option, is to make only revisions on the basis of existing regulations in 
order to remove the existing gaps in the regulations; second option is to develop an 
entirely new regulatory framework because there is no regulation available, which could 
be very costly; and third option is to leave the authority to the industries to develop the 
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standard for their products unless the “market failure or public opinion dictates the need 
for government involvement”.81 
In the case of GMO regulation, China opted for the second option because few rules were 
available for regulation of GMOs before 2002. But from 2002 on, China mainly choose 
the first option because of its fairly comprehensive agricultural regulations on GMO is 
already in place. The next step might be more on the consideration of biosafety issue, 
especially the concern of the environment and health associated with GMOs, since the 
initiative about commercialization of GM rice has been put on the agenda of Chinese 
government in recent years.  The public in China is increasingly concerned about the 
safety issue of GMOs, simply because rice contributes as the main stable food for 
Chinese dietary.  
 
Regulations of GMOs and Competent Authorities in China 
There are five major government agencies that are responsible for the regulation of 
GMOs. They are the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP, formerly State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)), the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the 
General Administration for Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ).  
The MOST is responsible for the national research and development of genetic 
engineering as designated by the Regulation on Genetic Engineering Management.
82
 
The MOA is mainly responsible for the regulation of agricultural GMOs. The 
Regulations on Safety of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms was adopted by 
the State Council in 2001, which designated the MOA as the competent authority to 
oversee the regulation of agricultural GMOs.  
According to the State Council Regulations, the MOA issued three implementation 
regulations in 2002 which are the Implementation Regulations on Safety Assessment of 
Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms; the Implementation Regulations on Safety 
of Import of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms; and the Implementation 
Regulations on Labeling of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms.
83
 The MOA 
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adopted a fourth regulation in 2006 as the Measures for Biological Processing Review 
and Approval for Agricultural Biotechnology.
84
  
The MEP is the focal point for implementation of the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol. Its 
main responsibility is to ensure the biosafety administration, i.e. the conservation of 
biodiversity and protection of environment.
85
 A National Biosafety Framework was 
formulated by the MEP with coordination of other relevant competent authorities in 1998 
and 1999.
86
 It provided for overall objectives and principles for national biosafety 
management, and aimed at establishing a sound biosafety administration system.
87
   
The MOH is mainly in charge of the management of GMO food. The MOH adopted the 
Administrative Measures on Hygiene of GMO Foodstuffs in 2002; it defined the GMO 
food and required that all food products containing GMOs be subject to a safety 
assessment and shall be labeled on the market.
88
 However, in 2007 MOH adopted the 
Administrative Measure on Novel Food with the intention to repeal the Administrative 
Measures on Hygiene of GMO Foodstuffs.
89
 Its article 2 (4) states that the Measure 
applies to the food ingredients of which the elements changed due to the use of new 
techniques. It is reasonable to include biotechnology as one of the new techniques.
90
In 
the recently adopted Food Safety Law of China, the Article 101provided that the Law 
applies to GM foods,
91
 however it also provided that if there is other specified law or 
regulations concerning GM food, then these special rules shall apply. Therefore, it is 
clear that the Administrative Measure on Novel Food is the main regulation for 
administration of GM food in China.   
The AQSIQ is mainly in charge of the import and export of GMOs, and it adopted the 
Administrative Measure on Inspection and Quarantine of Entry and Exit of GM Products 
in 2004, including the GMO inspection methods.
92
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Links between the Biosafety Protocol and China’s Biosafety Framework 
a. Precautionary Principle 
As stated in Article 1, the precautionary approach is the key element of the Biosafety 
Protocol.
93
 China applied this approach in its biosafety regulation,  such as the 
Regulations on Safety of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms provided that 
agricultural GMOs shall be evaluated as different catalogues based on their potential 
risks,
94
 and risk assessment shall be established to oversee the activities including 
research, experiment, production, process, operation, import and export of GMOs.
95
 Only 
upon the issue of a safety certificate can GMOs be released into the environment or 
approved for import, and all the products containing GMOs shall be labeled before placed 
on the market.
96
    
 
b. Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) 
Article 7 of the Biosafety Protocol provides that the AIA shall apply prior to the first 
intentional transboundary movement of LMOs for international introduction into the 
environment of the party of import, and article 8 provides that the party of export shall 
notify, or require the exporter to ensure notification in writing to the competent authority 
of the Party of import prior to the intentional transboundary movement of LMOs.
97
  
It is important to note that the application of the AIA is limited in scope, as it only 
applied to the GMOs that are intended for introduction into the environment of the party 
of importing,
98
 but as for those intended for food, feed or processing (FFP), the party of 
exporting only need to inform the parties of importing through the Biosafety Clearing-
House about their final decisions on domestic use of GMOs for FFP.
99
  
The Regulations on Safety of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms and 
Implementation Regulations on Safety of Import of Agricultural Genetically Modified 
Organisms
100
 incorporate these requirements but with broader scope of the GMOs 
including those for research and experiment, environmental release as well as food or 
feed processing for exporting and importing. The national regulations provided that both 
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of them shall follow the AIA procedure, and the decision shall be made by MOA and 
AQSIQ within 270 days upon the application from the exporters.
101
   
c. Liability Regime  
As stated before, the international liability and redress issue resulted as the 
Supplementary Protocol last year, but China has already included some provisions 
regarding liability issues into its national regulations, though most attention has been paid 
to the non-compliance to the procedural requirements of the administrative regulations 
rather than the biosafety issue.
102
    
The Regulations on Safety of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms provides that 
the MOA shall issue a suspension in case of illegal production and application of 
agricultural GMOs without due consent, and a fine of no less than RMB 20,000 (3000 US 
Dollars) will be imposed with a cap of RMB100,000 (15,000 US Dollars).
103
 Illegal 
importing of agricultural GMOs shall also be punished with a fine,
104
 and the operators 
who are not in line with labeling requirements of GMOs shall bear the responsibility 
according to the Implementation Regulations on Labeling of Agricultural Genetically 
Modified Organisms.
105
 
The current national regulations have not yet referred to any liability with regard to the 
biodiversity loss, health injuries or any social-economic concern associated with GMOs.  
 
Conclusion  
According to its priority and capacity, Chinese government mainly focuses on the 
agricultural GM crops and GM food. It is suggested that a more cohesive framework is 
needed to confront the biosafety issue associated with GMOs throughout their full 
lifecycle, and to avoid the unnecessary conflicts between competent authorities such as 
MOA and MEP while dealing with biosafety issues.
106
  
As the precautionary principle has been applied to all stages of the research and 
commercialization of GMOs in China, there are concerns about the post-market 
monitoring system and liability regime which shall be included into the biosafety 
framework as many other countries have already carried it out. No matter how effective 
regulations are to deal with the uncertainty of GMOs, unexpected risks and liability will 
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 Due to the core role of the MOA in regulation of GMOs, especially agricultural GMOs in China, the MEP 
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still come out due to misappropriate use of GMOs or ineffective enforcement of pre-
market legislations.  
China is drafting a National Biosafety Law since 2005, the MEP and MOST are leading 
the process with coordination of other related Ministries such as MOA and MOH. 
China’s next step might be to consider the incorporation of the new Supplementary 
Protocol into its own biosafety regime to oversee the import and export of GM crops, as 
well as efficiently manage cultivation of GM crop within China. 
It is expected that China will take into account the liability and redress of GMOs either as 
a provision in the proposed National Biosafety Law, or a specific liability decree, and 
inclusion of a liability clause seems to be necessary for China’s obligation to the 
Biosafety Protocol to deal with the uncertainty of GMOs, and to ensure the sustainable 
development of biotechnology.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
